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  ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
Sins of the Father:  
An Investigation into Judgments and Processes Involved in Within-family Tainting 
by 
Stephanie Allison Peak 
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychological and Brain Sciences 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2017 
Professor Alan J. Lambert, Chairperson 
The present research focused on a real-world event (i.e., the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks) as a 
basis for gaining insight about the spread of negativity (i.e., “tainting”) from a guilty father to an 
innocent son. The nature of the relationship between the son and the father was varied 
experimentally, a manipulation that allowed for investigation into the subjective importance of 
genetic versus social relationships. Across three experiments, I examined two types of judgments 
about the son, including responsibility and general evaluation of the target. Responsibility ratings 
were, on the average, extremely low. Indeed, many participants explicitly attributed no 
responsibility to the son. However, analyses of the general evaluation index also revealed 
significant evidence of tainting of the son, relative to a similarly-described person with no 
connections to the terrorist. Importantly, such evidence emerged even among participants who 
explicitly denied any responsibility on the part of the son. Moreover, the magnitude of tainting 
seemed to be determined most strongly by “nurture” (i.e., whether the terrorist father raised the 
son or not) rather than “nature” (i.e., the presence/absence of a genetic link). Generalizability 
considerations for extending the present paradigm to related domains are discussed.                   	  
  iv
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INTRODUCTION 
 
To what extent are individuals responsible for the sins of their relatives? This question 
has been considered in many different contexts for literally thousands of years. For example, the 
Bible describes a vengeful God who “will by no means leave the guilty unpunished, visiting the 
iniquity of fathers on the children and on the grandchildren to the third and fourth generations” 
(Exodus 34:7 New American Standard Bible). Such sentiments are echoed in Shakespeare’s 
Merchant of Venice, when Launcelot asserted, “the sins of the father are to be laid upon the 
children.” The present work refers to this phenomenon as moral tainting, which includes 
instances where perceivers respond negatively to an otherwise innocent person, simply because 
that person is related to a family member who has committed a crime or other moral 
transgression. The tendency to blame others for the transgressions of their relatives—such as in 
the proverbial “sins of the father” scenario—represents a phenomenon of great theoretical and 
practical interest.  
 Take for instance cultures in which “blood laws” are used as a basis for punishing 
innocent family members for the transgressions of their relatives.  In the not-so-distant past, 
citizens of the Soviet Union were often sent to forced labor camps (i.e., gulags) when one of their 
relatives had been accused of a crime (Appelebaum, 2003). Why might this practice haven taken 
place? How rational is the reasoning behind such imprisonment? Also relevant, cycles of 
retaliatory violence have been found in the context of feuds between rival families, including the 
conflict between the Hatfields and the McCoys (King, 2013), as well as acts of violence in 
present-day Albania, the Northern Caucasus, and Somalia (Boehm, 1984). Why might whole 
families wage war on one another due to the actions of a few? The present work aims to gain 
insight on these and other matters related to within-family moral tainting.
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Surprisingly little research has focused specifically on within-family moral tainting. 
Indeed, I was able find only three published papers that studied this phenomenon under 
controlled settings (Govern & Greco, 2002; Uhlmann, Zhu, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2012; Peak et al., 
2016). Govern and Greco (2002) asked participants to express their liking for a college student 
(“Steve Brown”) on the basis of a short and relatively mundane description. At the end of this 
description, participants were provided with a one-sentence description about one of his 
relatives. In three conditions, the relative was described as “serving a five year prison sentence 
for burglary and armed robbery”, but the nature of the family connection was varied (i.e., as a 
cousin, brother, or twin brother). In a fourth control condition, participants were told that Steve 
had an uncle who “once worked in the circus.”   
Investigators proposed two predictions. The first, which was confirmed, asserted that the 
target would be evaluated more negatively if his family member had a prison record than if this 
was not the case. The second prediction, which was not confirmed, suggested that the intensity of 
this negativity would vary as a function of genetic relatedness between the target and family 
member (i.e., cousin < brother < twin brother). In other words, even though a connection with a 
criminal family member did foster negativity towards the target, there was no evidence that the 
strength of this connection was systematically related to the degree of genetic relatedness.  
In the case of Uhlmann et al. (2012), three investigations were reported. In one study, 
participants read about a target’s grandfather (described as biologically related or unrelated to the 
target) who had mistreated workers in his factory years earlier. To probe the perceived 
responsibility of the target for the actions of his grandfather, participants were asked to indicate 
the extent to which the target should, or should not, be obligated to make financial reparations to 
the descendants of the victims. Results showed that recommendations of reparations were greater 
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if the target was biologically related to his grandfather than if he was not. Two follow up studies 
also provided evidence of the importance of biological kinship. For example, an additional study 
presented participants with a scenario about “Dennis” whose father (“Bojan Haravan”) was a 
notorious war criminal from Serbia and were told that this person was either (a) Dennis’ 
biological father, or (b) merely linked by marriage. Results suggested greater stigmatization of 
the target if he was biologically related to the war criminal than if he was not.   
A more recent examination into within-family tainting was completed by Peak, Eadeh, 
and Lambert (2016). In a series of four studies, within-family tainting was investigated by 
employing a scenario in which participants imagined their father had been killed. Then 
participants were asked to judge targets with varying relationships with the murderer (for details, 
see Peak et al., 2016). (For the sake of this review, I focused on judgments made about the son of 
the man who hypothetically killed the participants’ father.) The first two studies reported 
demonstrated an important dissociation between attributions of personal responsibility versus 
more general aversive reactions. In the latter case, this included general feelings of negativity 
and behavioral avoidance, as tapped by items such as “How negatively do you feel toward him?” 
and “I would be reluctant to shake his hand”. In the context of that prior work, answers to these 
and other similar questions correlated highly with one another. Hence, here (as in my earlier 
work) I use the term “aversiveness” as a general term based on an average of these types of 
reactions.  
One of the more provocative results from Peak et al. (2016) concerned the distinctly 
different pattern of results for judgments of responsibility. On the one hand, very few 
participants assigned any substantial degree of responsibility to the son. For example, in 
Experiment 2, a non-trivial percentage of the participants in that study (58%) gave the son the 
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lowest possible rating of responsibility on a 0-100 scale. Nevertheless, even among the same 
participants who explicitly denied any responsibility on the part of the son, I observed a strong 
tendency for participants to report aversive feelings towards the son.  
In addition to offering initial insight into the dissociation between these two classes of 
responses (i.e., responsibility, aversiveness), two of the studies reported by Peak et al. (2016) 
revealed information about the role of individual differences in these aversive responses. 
(Individual differences only played a role in the degree to which participants manifested aversive 
responding, as there was little variation in responsibility ratings.) In particular, results showed 
that variation in aversive reactions was systematically predicted by of individual differences in 
honor ideology as well as interdependence. Specifically, male participants who scored high in 
honor ideology responded more negatively to the son than those who scored low in honor 
ideology. However, for female participants, a different individual difference variable played a 
key role in predicting aversive reactions. There was a reliable relation between interdependence 
(but not collectivism) and aversive reactions to the target. Additionally, in the last study reported, 
genetic relatedness of the target was varied (biological son versus adopted). However, no effects 
were observed with regards to adopted status. However, Experiment 4 also manipulated the 
extent to which the original transgressor (the father) was punished for his crime. Results showed 
that punishment did have a significant effect on aversiveness ratings toward the son. That is, 
aversive responses were lowest (i.e. least negative) when participants were told that his father 
had already received severe punishment for his crime, with relatively higher levels of negativity 
when his father received either no punishment or only moderate punishment. 
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POTENTIAL MECHANISMS 
In order to better understand the rationale for the proposed studies to follow, 
consideration of research and theory relevant to possible mechanisms behind within-family 
tainting effects is paramount. Specifically, the mechanisms by which people might show 
evidence of aversive responding has relevant connections to at least three lines of research and 
theory, the nature of which I briefly consider below.   
Automatic Affective Transfer 
Here I refer to a cluster of diverse but interconnected research, all of which shows (in one 
way or another) the tendency for people to “transfer” feelings from one stimulus to another on 
the basis of a relatively superficial connection. This includes research on moral contagion 
(Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000), which has shown that negative feelings in response to a particular 
stimulus (say, disgust towards a convicted a mass murderer) can automatically “spread” to 
benign objects that pose no logical offense to the self (e.g., a sweater that he might have worn). 
This idea has some relation to courtesy stigmatization (Goffman, 1963), which suggests that you 
might feel that your neighbor’s moral integrity has been compromised simply because of the 
association with an unsavory relative. Such dynamics are also related to research on spontaneous 
transference (Carlston & Skowronski, 2005), which has shown that a neutral stimulus can 
“acquire” positive or negative associations, simply by being associated with a favorable or 
unfavorable stimulus. Taken as whole, this research is particularly important in this context, 
because it allows for the fact that family tainting could occur even in the absence of any 
genetic/biological connection. 
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Essentialism 
Uhlmann et al. (2012) proposed a “common-sense essentialism” (p. 240) framework, in 
which, when individuals are perceived to be tied by essential bonds of blood kinship, “the taint 
of one person’s actions (i.e., their ‘moral essence’) could spread from one person to another.” 
This model suggests that the degree of tainting should be at least somewhat connected to the 
degree of genetic relatedness but, as noted earlier, this is not what Govern and Greco (2002) 
found. Moreover, several lines of research have shown that an intrinsically neutral stimulus can 
be tainted by its association with negative stimuli, even when genetic relatedness is completely 
absent.  
Justice-Related Goals 
Above and beyond the considerations raised thus far, justice-related motives (Lerner, 
1980), such as people’s general desire to “see that no crime goes unpunished”, could intensify 
the spread of negativity from one family member to another, even when such transfer is not 
justified. For example, negativity felt towards an otherwise innocent son of a criminal might, 
perhaps, be somewhat greater if his unambiguously guilty father was perceived to have 
improperly avoided punishment, compared to a scenario in which the father had received his 
“just deserts.” Peak et al. (2016) suggest that aversive responses to the target (son) were lowest 
(i.e., least negative) when participants were told that the target’s father had already received 
severe punishment for his crime (i.e., was tried, convicted, and sentenced to life in prison 
without the possibility of parole). Further, significantly higher levels of negativity were revealed 
when the target’s father received either (a) no punishment (i.e., was never tried or punished) or 
(b) only moderate punishment (sentenced to eight years in jail).  
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Summary 
As seen from the preceding discussion, at least three classes of psychological processes 
could be responsible for within-family tainting. However, it would be unwise to conclude that 
one and only one of these processes is responsible. In particular, it is entirely possible that all 
three processes could play a role under certain boundary conditions. In other words, showing 
support for one class of process does not automatically rule out the viability of the other two.  
One of the general goals of my research is to provide greater clarity on these matters. 
OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT EXPERIMENTS 
 The overall goal of the present research was to gain more insight into the phenomenon of 
within-family tainting, above and beyond what is already known about this phenomenon (cf. 
Govern & Greco, 2002; Uhlmann, Zhu, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2012; see also Peak, Eadeh, & 
Lambert, 2016). As noted in the preceding sections, the process of within-family tainting has 
long been of interest to scholars in a number of disparate areas outside of psychology (e.g., 
theology, anthropology) and it is related to several existing areas of psychological research (e.g., 
stigmatization, essentialism, ideological beliefs about families). Such research has informed and 
guided my previous work in this area (Peak et al., 2016), and it continues to serve as a 
foundation for the present set of studies. This design of these studies was informed by previous 
work on tainting, individual differences, and cognitive load. Hence, although my work obviously 
builds on the extant literature, the present research was designed to significantly advance what is 
already currently known about within-family tainting.  
 Three experiments are presented. Each study presented participants with information 
about the terrorist activities of Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who was responsible for the Paris attacks 
of 2015. After this, participants were then presented with (relatively sparse) information about a 
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person, ostensibly Mr. Abaaoud’s son. A major interest in all three studies was whether the 
emergence of any tainting of the son would vary as a function of the nature of the relationship 
between father and son.  For example, in some conditions the son was genetically related to the 
father but was raised by another family, whereas in other cases, the son was raised by the 
terrorist but was genetically related to another man. In the context of measuring participants’ 
impressions of the son, I focused on trait ratings as well as participants’ feelings (e.g., of 
aversion) towards this individual.  
Experiments 1 and 2 were fairly similar to each other. However, as I shall describe in 
more detail later, each study used a somewhat different approach to establishing a baseline 
control condition (a methodological detail critical to detecting the presence of tainting). Most 
elements of Experiment 3 were similar to the first two studies, but in this last study I added an 
experimental manipulation of cognitive load to gain insight into the role of automatic versus 
controlled processes in my paradigm.  
A NOTE ABOUT INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 
     Unlike my previous work, the primary focus of my dissertation was not on individual 
differences. In particular, I did not propose any specific hypotheses or predictions with respect to 
these individual differences, over and above the experimental manipulations that were developed 
specifically for my dissertation. In other words, my primary orientation was nomothetic rather 
than idiographic. Nevertheless, it seemed sensible, for mostly exploratory reasons, to measure 
individual difference variables, in order to investigate the extent to which the aforementioned 
manipulations might be contingent on individual differences (i.e., reveal manipulation x 
personality interactions). In Table 1, I present an overview of the individual difference variables 
that were included in each of my studies.  
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 Given the somewhat exploratory nature of these analyses, there is the danger of over-
interpreting “chance” findings that did not replicate across the experiments reported here. For 
example, it would be pointless to offer a complicated and speculative explanation of an 
interaction that emerged in Experiment 1, only to find that it did not replicate in Experiments 2 
and 3. In the context of analyzing each individual experiment, therefore, I conducted a series of 
initial multiple regression analyses, corresponding to each of the individual difference measures 
assessed in that study. This ultimately allowed me to determine whether any moderation effects 
replicated across all three studies. In all cases, tests of moderation were conducted using Hayes’s 
(2016) PROCESS program, which specifically allows testing for moderation using multi-level 
categorical variables in conjunction with continuous independent variables. (This program was 
useful for my purposes because the main categorical variable of interest in my study, relationship 
of the son to the father, contained more than two levels.)  
As seen in Table 1, there were four individual difference variables that were measured 
across all three experiments, namely, need for cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), 
interdependence (Cross, Bacon, & Morris, 2000), social dominance orientation (Sidanius & 
Pratto, 2001), and right wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 2007). In fact, there were no instances 
in which I observed a significant moderator effect that replicated across all three studies. 
(Experiment 3 revealed a significant interaction involving SDO. However, there was no evidence 
of this effect in the other two studies. Again, probing of this interaction in Experiment 3 would 
not be advisable, given that it was apparently spurious.) Aside from testing for the presence of 
moderator effects, I also conducted correlational analyses, testing for the relationship between 
the various individual difference variables and my primary dependent variables. Although these 
latter effects were not of great theoretical interest, I report these in Appendix H.   
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EXPERIMENT 1 
Experiment 1 was designed to address a number of interrelated objectives as they 
pertained to cross-generational tainting effects between a guilty father (e.g., terrorist) and an 
otherwise innocent son. In particular, this study was designed to gain insight with respect to two 
factors that could play in a role in this type of judgmental setting: (a) the nature of the son’s 
relationship to his father and (b) the types of judgments being made about the son.   
Nature of the Relationship Between the Son and Father 
The existing literature on inter-generational tainting (Govern & Greco, 2002; Uhlmann et 
al., 2012; also see Peak et al., 2016) has yet to resolve several questions as they pertain to the 
type of relationship between the original perpetrator and another family member. As noted 
earlier, the literature provides mixed evidence supporting the idea that genetics play a key role in 
determining within-family tainting. In some cases, sharing genes is sufficient for negative 
appraisal. In addition, the extent to which bad behaviors are learned through social 
links/observation has also been considered (Bandura, 1963; 1977; Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 
1961). Others have postulated that labels are important in mediating hostility generalization 
(Berkowitz & Knurek, 1969). Names are a common way to show familial linkage. Thus, tainting 
may take place in response to two individuals sharing a surname. Thus, it is not yet clear as to 
the nature of the relationships that would lead to tainting in real world contexts to be considered 
ahead.  
In the sections to follow, I outline the types of descriptions employed to communicate 
key information about the target. The present series of studies is unique in its experimental 
manipulation of: (a) the genetic relationship with a criminal, as well as (b) opportunities for 
social learning from a criminal father (i.e., being raised by him). In sum, the present work is the 
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first to systematically vary the genetic contribution as well as the social learning role of the 
perpetrator. 
Type of Target Judgment 
A major point to emerge from Peak et al. (2016) was that the presence (or absence) of 
within-family tainting processes may depend on the type of judgment being used to assess it. In 
particular, Peak et al. (2016) found very little evidence of such tainting when assessed using 
explicit questions about personal responsibility. For example, most participants indicated that the 
son of an unambiguously guilty father was not at all responsible for the actions of his parent. At 
the same time, however, these same participants reported quite negative responses towards the 
son, when framed in the context of social distancing questions. In short, participants seemed to 
be strongly asserting that the son was legally innocent of his father’s wrongdoing, but they also 
indicated a general sense that they would not want to interact with the son.  
In theory, these findings could be interpreted as showing that people are careful about not 
attributing actual blame to the son, but would be perfectly willing to attribute other sorts of 
(possibly nuanced) negativity to him. If this is indeed the case, one could find that participants 
would show a significant support for distancing themselves from the son. In addition, 
participants might also tend to ascribe more negative traits to the son (such as inferring that he is 
less honest, more dangerous, and so forth). Thus, the present work goes beyond these two classes 
of judgments and investigates how trait inference judgments function.  
A NOTE ABOUT THE CONCEPTUALIZATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF 
JUDGMENT INDICES 
 As noted above, I had a strong a priori interest in focusing specifically on explicit ratings 
of responsibility (e.g., whether the son should be held responsible for the actions of his father). 
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As I will show in my analyses, these data provided ample justification for retaining a separate 
focus on these ratings, in contrast to more general evaluations of the target. In particular, the 
latter type of judgment provides leverage on testing for the presence of “tainting” effects, over 
and above explicit ratings of responsibility.    
 As for the processes involving tainting, I also proposed that this process might differ as a 
function of what type of judgment was being assessed. On the one hand, one type of judgment 
could pertain to trait ratings of the target, such as assessment of that person’s honesty or 
intelligence. Another type of judgment, however, pertains to assessment of general feelings 
about the target, such as how comfortable or uncomfortable participants might feel shaking the 
target’s hand. In each of the three experiments reported in this dissertation, I conducted an initial 
set of analyses that took this distinction into account. That is, I first created two different 
judgmental indices (i.e., traits vs. feelings), culling from items that I had a priori designated as 
belonging to those two categories. (In all cases, these indices were internally consistent, that is, 
yielded alphas > .80). Then, I conducted a series of analyses probing for tainting effects, using 
both sets of judgmental indices.   
 In all of my experiments, results were quite clear: My data provided no empirical 
justification for separating the trait ratings from the feeling-based ratings, and vice versa. Two 
types of findings pointed strongly in this direction. First, all three experiments showed a virtually 
identical pattern of results across these two indices. In other words, any evidence of tainting 
using the trait index was revealed in virtually identical fashion using indices of feeling-based 
approach/avoidance. Second, principal components analyses (using an unrotated solution) 
always generated one primary factor on which all of the items from these two categories loaded 
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extremely highly.1 Hence, although I had a theoretical interest in separating these two classes of 
judgments from each other, my data provided no empirical basis for doing so.  
Given this state of affairs, it thus seemed most sensible to use the following strategy.  
Whenever I was testing for the presence for tainting, I simply took all of the evaluative-type 
target ratings into account—including items tapping “traits” as well as “feelings”—using the 
factor score generated by the aforementioned principal components analyses. This index, which 
was standardized, was always coded such that higher numbers indicated more negative ratings of 
the target. In addition to this overall index of negativity, however, I also focused on explicit 
ratings of responsibility as a separate index in its own right.  
Overview of Methodology: Experiment 1 
In this study—as in all of the experiments to be reported in this dissertation—the 
procedure consisted of three stages. In the first stage, participants were presented with 
information about an actual terrorist, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who was the mastermind of the 
Paris attacks. The purpose of that stage was merely to unambiguously establish the guilt of this 
individual.   
In the second stage of the experiment, participants were then prompted with a brief 
description of a young boy, named Younes Abaaoud. Along with these descriptions, in all cases, 
participants were presented with a small picture of Younes. (In reality, this was actually a picture 
of Mr. Abaaoud’s younger brother.) Hence, although there was some deception in this study, it 
was relatively benign, in the sense that the target being judged really was related to an actual 
terrorist. Given my paradigm focuses on the transference of tainting between generations 
(specifically fathers and sons), I simply described him as his son, rather than his brother. The 
third stage consisted of a series of judgments about Younes. As I note below, my design 
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contained three conditions in which I varied the nature of the relationship of Younes to his 
father. The design also contained a fourth, control condition, the nature of which I shall consider 
presently.   
Experimental Condition 1 (Raised by terrorist/genetically related) 
The purpose of this condition was to convey, to participants, that Younes was raised by 
his father and that he was genetically related to him. In conversational norms, this kind of 
relationship is a strong cultural “default”, which is assumed whenever one says that “X is the son 
of person Y”. Hence, in this condition, participants were simply told that Abdelhamid Abaaoud 
(the main mastermind of the Paris attacks) has a son, Younes Abaaoud. After being presented 
with this information, participants were further informed that Authorities are currently seeking 
the whereabouts of Younes and, if apprehended, will be brought in for further questioning.  
Experimental Condition 2 (Adopted by terrorist/no genetic relation) 
In this condition, participants were told that Abdelhamid Abaaoud—the main mastermind 
of the Paris attacks—adopted a son, who he raised from birth (Younes Abaaoud). Hence, this 
information was similar to Condition 1 in retaining the social relationship, but it removed the 
genetic connection. As in Condition 1, the presentation of this information was followed by 
notice that the authorities were currently seeking the whereabouts of Younes, using the same 
wording as the prompt used in the first condition.    
Experimental Condition 3 (Adopted by another family/genetic link to terrorist).   
In this condition, participants were told that Abdelhamid Abaaoud (the main mastermind 
of the Paris attacks) has a son, who was adopted and raised by a family in a village far away. 
This boy’s name is Younes Taheri. In essence, then, Condition 3 represents the obverse of the 
second condition, one that retains the genetic link to the terrorist, but removes the social 
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relationship (i.e., “nature, no nurture”). As in Conditions 1 and 2, this information was again 
followed by notice that Younes was being sought by authorities, using the same wording as in 
those other two studies.  
Experimental Condition 4 (Control) 
  As with most experimental designs, a meaningful control group is an important 
desideratum. However, this was especially true in my paradigm.  In particular, detection of 
whether there is any tainting of the target—via a guilty family relative—absolutely requires a 
meaningful baseline of comparison. Stated another way, the absence of a meaningful baseline 
condition precludes any conclusions being made about tainting at all.  
Nevertheless, the construction of the control group presented some surprisingly complex 
considerations. In particular, I discovered that there were at least two “solutions” to generating a 
proper control group, each with their own respective advantages and disadvantages. That is, each 
approach to constructing a control group contained a “trade off” of sorts, insofar as it was able to 
address certain issues very effectively, but at the cost of addressing others. The approach 
described below represented one of these strategies, and was implemented in Experiment 1. As 
will become clearer later in this dissertation, I took a different approach in Experiment 2.  It is 
important to note, however, that the different strategy that I used in Experiment 2 ultimately 
generated the same conclusions as Experiment 1, and vice versa. The convergence of my results 
across the two studies is important to keep in mind, because it shows that the methodological 
choices made here ultimately did not make a difference in terms of my actual results. 
 In Experiment 1, I was most concerned about establishing a baseline control condition for 
the son, while removing (a) any mention of a guilty father but also (b) any priming of terrorist 
threat (i.e., the description of the Paris bombings). The rationale for this decision is that priming 
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participants with any information about terrorist threat could potentially alter how participants 
responded to a young Arabic boy, even if there was no family connection to the terrorist in 
question. However, in removing all of this “terrorist-related” information, this presented 
something of a methodological challenge in its own right.  In particular, it now became necessary 
to provide participants with a meaningful task in which they could form an impression of 
Younes. For participants in the control condition in Experiment 1, therefore, they were presented 
with the following set of instructions:     
Research and theory on social judgment (e.g., Wyer & Srull, 1986) has shown that people 
are capable of forming meaningful impressions of other people, even when the available 
information is somewhat "sparse" or limited.  In particular, people seem to use the 
information that is presented, and then use that information as a basis for inferring, or 
extrapolating, to any judgments that might be made. The purpose of our research is to 
gain further insight into that process. On the next screen, we will be presenting you with 
some information about a particular individual. Please attend to this information 
carefully, as we will be asking you to remember some of the details and make some 
judgments. In other words, please consider this information in a thoughtful way, as this 
will prepare you to answer the questions we will pose later.  
 
At this point, participants were presented with some “pseudo-diagnostic” information about him. 
(By pseudo-diagnostic, I refer to information that appears to provide personal information about 
the target, but actually provides no truly meaningful information about his personality. This 
information was inserted because research and theory on impression formation suggests that 
people will be reluctant to express judgments of a target person if there is a complete absence of 
any information about the target at all; cf. Darley & Gross, 1983) This information consisted of 
just a few sentences about Younes, as follows:  
Younes Taheri is a twelve year old boy and lives in Syria, near the northern border to 
Turkey. During the week, he attends school, where he is learning Arabic, science, and 
math. He has a younger brother who is nine and attends school with him, and a sister who 
is four. On the weekends, he likes to spend time with family, and play outside with his 
friends. His best friend is eleven years old and lives next door. 
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Following the presentation of this information, the remainder of the study was largely the same 
as for the other conditions. However, it was necessary to remove any reference to his supposed 
“responsibility” for the terrorist attack, since no such mention of this attack occurred in the first 
place.  
Summary of Experiment 1 Design 
 In summary, Experiment 1 randomly assigned participants to one of four conditions. In 
three of these conditions, participants were initially presented with information about the terrorist 
acts of a person named Abdelhamid Abaaoud.  In these conditions, participants were then 
presented with information about Abaaoud’s son, whose relationship to his father varied as a 
function of experimental condition. There was also a fourth condition, which served as a baseline 
control.  In that condition, all references to the terrorist (Abdelhamid Abaaoud)—as well as his 
terrorist acts—were completely removed. For reasons noted above, this necessitated some 
modification of the task, including the insertion of a different cover story, as well as the inclusion 
of some pseudo diagnostic information about Younes.  
An “Advance Preview” of the Methodological Approach Taken in Experiment 2 
 It is true, on the one hand, that the control condition in Experiment 1 provided a 
reasonable way to establish a neutral baseline. However, as with many methodological solutions, 
there were some drawbacks to that choice. For example, the control condition contained a 
different instructional set and pseudo diagnostic information that was not present in the other 
three conditions. In addition, the first three conditions “primed” participants with the threat of 
terrorism whereas this was not true of the control condition. In theory, at least, these represent 
experimental confounds. That is, in my effort to create a meaningful control group, this meant 
that the control group differed from the other conditions in a variety of different ways.  I did not 
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consider these confounds to be particularly serious but they should not, of course, be ignored.  
Given these considerations, it seemed prudent to take a somewhat different methodological 
approach in Experiment 2, the nature of which I will describe in more detail later. As it turns out, 
I was being over-cautious, as my results revealed a very similar pattern of results, regardless of 
how the control group issue was operationalized.  
Predictions for Experiment 1 
Prediction 1 
Theoretical replication of Peak et al. (2016) would predict that ratings of explicit personal 
responsibility of the target for the transgressions of his father will be very low. In addition, I 
postulate there will still be evidence of tainting (aversion, negative trait ratings), even if ratings 
of responsibility are indeed minimal.  
Prediction 2 
Given evidence presented by Govern and Greco (2002) and Peak et al. (2016), I predict 
that the target will be evaluated more negatively if he is related to a terrorist than if he is not. I 
anticipate that the severity of tainting will systematically vary by type of relationship. In 
particular, (a) the target with genetic and social links will be judged most harshly, (b) the targets 
with either genetic or social links (but not both) will be moderately tainted, and (c) the control 
target (with no relationship to the criminal) will be judged with very low negativity. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
A total of 157 residents of the United States2 (45 male, 109 female, 2 trans, 1 preferred 
not to answer) were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk, in return for a small gift 
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voucher. The experiment included one between-subjects manipulation, pertaining to the 
relationship between the terrorist and the target. 
Stimuli and Procedure  
 Assessment of individual differences. After completing the consent form, participants 
completed a series of individual difference measures, which were designed to assess several 
constructs of potential relevance to the tainting process.  These included measures of (a) honor 
ideology (Barnes, Brown, & Osterman, 2012), (b) interdependence (Cross, Bacon, & Morris, 
2000), (c) collectivism (Triandis & Gelfland, 1998), (d) need for cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, & 
Kao, 1984), (e) right-wing authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 2007), and (f) social dominance 
orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). As I noted in an earlier section, analyses involving one of 
these variables—need for cognition—consistently revealed a theoretically important pattern of 
results; I present these NFC-related effects in a separate section after reporting the main analyses 
for Experiment 2.   
Presentation of incriminating information about father. Next, all participants were 
presented with a reminder of the Paris attacks on November 13th, 2015 consisting of a timeline of 
events as well as a description of the terrorist thought to be behind the attacks (i.e., Abdelhamid 
Abbaoud). Information presented to participants is shown in Appendix A.   
Presentation of target information. After this, participants were randomly assigned to 
one of four experimental conditions, which varied the nature of the target description (see 
Appendix B).  
Target rating task.  After reading the information presented about the target (Younes), 
participants were then asked to make a series of judgments of this person, the nature of which are 
described in more detail ahead. In developing this judgment task, I was mindful of the fact that 
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participants assigned to Conditions 1-3 had just been provided with information about the 
target’s father (the terrorist). As such, it was important that participants knew that their goal was 
to form judgments of the young boy, not his father.  Thus, prior to making any judgments, 
participants in Conditions 1-3 were told “for the following questions, we would like you indicate 
how you would respond to Younes Abaaoud, the younger of the two people you just read about.”   
Assessment of general negativity. As noted earlier, my questionnaire was originally 
designed to provide separate measures of trait ratings as well as general feelings of 
approach/avoidance. For example, one block of questions was specifically devoted towards 
assessing inferences of personality traits along a variety of different dimensions (presented in 
randomized order), half of which were positive (e.g., honest, smart, friendly), and half of which 
were negative (e.g., dangerous, immoral, unfriendly). In contrast, a separate block of items was 
designed to capture how participants might respond to the target if they met him ‘face to face’, 
again with a randomized presentation of positively and negatively worded items (e.g., I would 
feel calm and collected; I would feel uneasy). Still other items, measured in a separate block, 
measured more general reactions to the target (e.g., How positively do you feel towards him? 
How negative do you feel towards him?).  
As it turns out, however, the basis for making any “distinctions” of this sort (e.g., 
between trait ratings and feelings) was not supported empirically. This can be clearly seen by the 
pattern of loadings from the first initial factor of a principal components analyses (with unrotated 
solution). Loadings are presented in Table 2. As seen here, all of the items loaded highly on this 
factor, which simply appeared to be a general index of negativity with higher numbers indicating 
relatively unfavorable reactions to the target. In the primary analyses to be reported ahead, 
therefore, assessment of participants’ reaction to the target was based on a standardized factor 
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score, as generated by SPSS. As with all factor scores of this type, this index represents a 
statistical combination of all of the items in the analyses, weighted by their respective loadings 
on that factor.    
Assessment of explicit responsibility. For participants in Conditions 1-3 (i.e., those who 
had been informed that Younes was related to the terrorist), I was particularly interested in 
measuring participants’ explicit ratings of responsibility. This was assessed via presentation of 
three items: To what extent is Younes responsible for the Paris terror attacks?; In general, how 
much do you blame him for the Paris terror attacks?’ Should he be legally charged for the Paris 
terror attacks? For all three items, participants were asked to make their ratings along a scale 
ranging from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much so). A composite measure of explicit responsibility 
was formed on the basis of an average of these three items (α = .94).   
In this type of paradigm, one could argue that assessment of responsibility might be 
contingent on what types of judgments participants might have made prior to expressing their 
opinions about responsibility. For this reason, I randomized the order in which participants 
encountered these items, relative to the other types of items in the questionnaire. For example, 
some participants made responsibility ratings prior to making any trait ratings of the target, 
whereas some participants made these ratings after the trait ratings. In addition, when 
participants were presented with these three items, the order in which they actually appeared to 
the participants was also randomized. None of the effects reported in this paper (here, as well as 
in Experiments 2 and 3) were contingent on either type of ordering manipulation. 
 Demographics. Information about participant gender, race, education, and income were 
collected. Appendix C provides descriptive information pertaining to these demographic 
variables. 
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Results 
Analyses focus on two types of judgments. First, I will present the findings related to 
explicit responsibility. Then, results concerning general negativity are presented. The mean and 
standard deviation for judgment ratings in each condition are presented in Table 3. In addition, 
an investigation into evidence of tainting (i.e., negative responses) when responsibility is rated at 
zero will be discussed.  
Explicit Responsibility 
 It is useful at the outset to present the overall frequency distribution of composite 
responsibility ratings, temporarily collapsing over conditions. As seen in Figure 1, ratings of 
responsibility were fairly low (grand mean = 22.08). This figure also illustrated the limited 
variability of responsibility ratings. Nearly a third of participants (27%) in Conditions 1-3 
responded that the target had zero responsibility for the terrorist attacks.3 Thus, participants 
generally disavowed any responsibility on the part of the target, vis a vis his guilty father.  
Mean levels of responsibility attributed to the son were very similar across Conditions 1, 2, and 3 
(Ms = 20.04, 29.26, 16.97, respectively). 
General Evaluation of the Target (General Negativity) 
 Here I consider participants’ general evaluation of the target. Recall that these sentiments 
were operationalized in the form of a standardized factor score, based on an unrotated principal 
components analyses of all of the dependent variables, except for the explicit responsibility 
ratings. Recall also that higher numbers on this index reflected more negative impression of the 
target. In the discussion to follow, I use the label “general negativity” as a heuristically useful 
reminder that these evaluations provide an index of tainting vis a vis the guilty father.  
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In order to understand how the average level of negativity might have varied as a 
function of condition, I next submitted the general negativity index to a one-way ANOVA. This 
analysis revealed a significant effect of condition, F(3, 157) = 80.97, ηp2 = .614, p < .001. A 
graph showing the pattern of means responsible for this effect is presented in Figure 2. As seen 
here, these findings strongly suggest the presence of tainting relative to the control condition (see 
also ahead for follow-up contrast coding). That is, when participants were told that the young 
boy had some sort of family connection to a notorious terrorist, this led participants to respond 
more negatively to him compared to the control condition. This finding is important because it 
provides far more compelling evidence of within-family tainting relative to my earlier work. 
In order to more formally confirm which conditions were actually different from each 
other, I then conducted a series of contrast analyses, including all possible pair-wise comparisons 
among and between the four conditions. These analyses revealed that all of the conditions were 
different from each other, save for one. In particular, the mean rating from Condition 1 (Raised 
by terrorist/genetically related) did not significantly differ from the mean rating of Condition 2 
(Adopted by terrorist/no genetic relation), F(1, 79) = .009, p =.92, Cohen’s d = .03. In all other 
cases, however, each of these means were significantly different from each other, all Fs > 5.07, 
all ps < .03, all ηp2s > .062 (degrees of freedom in these analyses are identical to those reported 
immediately above).   
Further Investigation into General Negativity in the Absence of Any  
Explicit Responsibility 
The preceding analyses are critically important in the context of my dissertation, given 
that they provide evidence for the presence of tainting of an otherwise innocent son vis a vis a 
guilty father. However, the responsibility ratings, as discussed above, provided me with an 
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opportunity to generate even more compelling evidence for such tainting. In particular, a fairly 
large number of my participants disavowed any responsibility on the part of the son. More 
concretely, these participants gave the son a rating of “0” –the lowest possible score, on a 100-
point scale—every time they were asked to make an assessment of the son’s responsibility vis a 
vis the crimes of his father. This raises a provocative question: Would I find evidence of tainting 
here too, even among the participants who strongly denied any responsibility on the part of the 
son?  
In order to test this idea empirically, I temporarily applied a filter in SPSS, so that it 
included only those participants whose composite responsibility ratings were 0 (the lowest 
possible rating on the 100-point rating scale). Thus, these participants had told us three times that 
they did not attribute any responsibility to the son. The question of key interest here was whether 
the negativity ratings, as provided by these participants, would be any different from the ratings 
of the control target. To this end, I thus conducted a one-way ANOVA on the negativity index 
with the “zero responsibility” participants from Conditions 1-3, plus all of the participants who 
had been assigned to the control condition.  
As seen in Figure 3, there did indeed appear to be significant tainting of the son, even 
among participants who, themselves, had explicitly denied that the son bore any responsibility 
for the actions of his father. This pattern of means was responsible for a main effect of 
experimental condition, F(3, 71) = 32.689, p < .001, ηp2 = .59. Given the theoretical importance 
of this effect it was important to conduct further analyses to verify which of these conditions 
differed from the control.   
In fact, all of these contrasts with the control condition were significant. In particular, 
three separate contrast analyses (each involving a contrast with the control) revealed a significant 
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difference between the control and (a) Condition 1 (Raised by terrorist/genetically related), F(1, 
49) = 69.655 p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.45 (b) Condition 2 (Adopted by terrorist/no genetic 
relation), F(1, 45) = 45.911, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.51, as well as with (c) Condition 3 (Adopted 
by another family/ genetic link to terrorist), F(1, 55) = 55.445, p < .001, Cohen’s d  = 2.02. 
Hence, regardless of the nature of the relationship between the son and his guilty father, these 
analyses showed tangible presence of tainting, even among the very participants who explicitly 
denied that the son bore any responsibility at all! 
Discussion 
My first prediction postulated that ratings of explicit personal responsibility of the target 
for the transgressions of his father will be very low. This was what I found (grand mean = 
22.08). This figure also illustrated the limited variability of responsibility ratings. 27% of 
participants responded that their given target should not at all be considered personally 
responsible. This general rejection of responsibility replicates my previous work and shows 
extension of findings to another paradigm, one that involves a real-world crime (vs. hypothetical 
scenario). In addition, I postulated there would still be evidence of tainting (aversion, negative 
trait ratings), even if ratings of responsibility are indeed minimal. I found to be true as well. By 
completing analyses on just those who attribute zero responsibility, I gained leverage in 
determining that a disassociation between within-family tainting judgments does exist. 
Second, I predicted that targets with a relationship with the terrorist (albeit genetic or 
social) will be evaluated more negatively than if he is not. As in Peak et al., (2016) all ‘son’ 
targets were evaluated more negatively than control targets. In addition, the severity of negativity 
varied systematically by type of relationship, with one exception. There was no difference in 
negativity between Condition 1 (Raised by terrorist/genetically related) and Condition 2 
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(Adopted by terrorist/no genetic relation). Thus, tainting is highest when the relationship 
between target and criminal involves a strong social connection (i.e., being raised by the 
terrorist). As for the target whose relationship with the terrorist was only genetic, he tended to be 
judged less negatively than the other ‘son’ condition counterparts. However, the target sharing 
only genetic connection to the terrorist (Condition 3) did elicit significantly more negativity than 
control targets. Thus, at least on the basis of these data, “nurture”—being raised by the 
terrorist—seemed to be playing a larger role than the presence or absence of a genetic 
relationship.  
EXPERIMENT 2 
Given the provocative and fairly novel effects generated in Experiment 1, it seemed 
prudent to conduct a second study in order to verify the robustness of these findings. As I will 
discuss in more detail ahead, however, Experiment 2 took a somewhat different methodological 
approach in the service of further establishing the validity of the baseline (control) condition. 
This necessitated a few changes to my general methodology, both as it applied to the control 
condition, but also more generally. 
  To begin, all of the participants in Experiment 2, regardless of condition, were given the 
initial “impression formation instructions” and all were provided with the same set of pseudo-
diagnostic information about Younes that had been presented in the control condition in 
Experiment 1. In addition, I removed all references to the fact that “authorities were looking for 
Younes”. In combination, these changes removed several confounds that were present in my first 
study. Moreover, by removing information about the “authorities” who were looking for the 
target, this also eliminated the possibility that participants might have inferred some guilt on the 
part of the son, simply because the authorities were looking for him.  
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In the context of presenting the method for Experiment 1, I had noted that the presence of 
any information related to terrorism could, in principle, make a difference in terms of how 
participants would respond to a young Arab boy. In order to test this idea, I included two slightly 
different versions of the control group. In one control group, all references to Mr. Abaaoud—as 
well as his terrorist acts—were removed, consistent with what was done in Experiment 1. This 
was my preferred version of the control group, since it most closely matched the approach taken 
in Experiment 1. In a second version of the control condition, however, participants were 
initially presented with information regarding the terrorist acts of Abaaoud, while removing any 
family links between these individuals. I did not expect to use this second control condition in 
my formal analyses, but it did provide me with an opportunity to see if the mere presence of the 
terrorist information, in and of itself, would significantly affect ratings of the young boy.  
Summary of Design 
In summary, Experiment 2 contained a total of five experimental conditions. Three of 
these (Conditions 1-3) presented participants with information about the son of a guilty father. 
These three conditions manipulated the nature of the relationship between son and father in a 
manner paralleling Experiment 1, albeit with a few methodological changes. The other two 
conditions served as a controls, in the sense that participants were not provided with any 
connections between the young boy and Mr. Abaaoud. However, this “father free” condition was 
created in two different ways.   
In one of these controls, participants were not presented with any information about the 
terrorist (or about the Paris attacks) in the first place. Hence, here I eliminated any possible 
connection to the terrorist, by simply removing this information in the protocol.  In the second 
control condition, participants were initially presented with information about these terrorist 
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activities of Mr. Abaaoud. However, when participants were later provided with information 
about the young boy, they were not provided with any information that linked him to the actions 
of Mr. Abaaoud. To reiterate a point made earlier, each of these control conditions have merits in 
their own right, even though their approach to establishing a baseline condition were obviously 
different from one other. As I will show below, the pattern of means emerging from these two 
control conditions were rather similar to one another.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
A total of 200 residents of the United States (64 male, 134 female, 1 trans, 1 prefer not to 
answer) were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk, in return for a small gift voucher. The 
experiment included one between-subjects manipulation (five levels), pertaining to the 
information presented regarding the target’s relationship with terrorist Abdelhamid Abaaoud.  
Stimuli and Procedure  
The stimuli and procedure of Experiment 2 are nearly identical to that described in 
Experiment 1, except as noted below. Participants again completed individual difference 
measures, read instructions and an overview of the 2015 Paris terror attacks, then were randomly 
assigned to condition. As before, each condition varied the relationship between the young boy 
(Younes) and the terrorist. In this study, participants were randomly assigned to one of five 
conditions. This included the three versions of the “son” condition (Conditions 1-3) as well as 
two control groups (Conditions 4 and 5). The target descriptions used in Experiment 2 are 
presented in Appendix D.  The remainder of the experiment, including the nature of the 
judgment tasks and collection of demographic information, was the same as that used in 
Experiment 1.  
	  29	  
Initial Analyses on the Two Control Conditions 
 Before presenting my main analyses, it is useful to know whether the presence (vs. 
absence) of the terrorist-related information about the Paris attacks made a significant difference 
in terms of how participants responded to the young boy. Analyses revealed no reliable 
difference in terms of how participants generally responded to the young boy as a function of 
whether terrorist information was present (M = -.40) or absent (M = -.67), F(1, 81) = 2.903, ηp2 = 
.035, p = .09. The marginal effect in question merely reveals a small (and relatively 
uninteresting) trend to respond more negatively to the boy if primed with terrorist-related 
information than if not. It is important to recall that the second control listed above (Condition 5 
- without terrorist-related information) was most similar to that of Experiment 1. Hence, to 
maximize comparison between the two studies, the remainder of the main analyses in 
Experiment 2 focused on this control condition only.  
Results 
 
As in Experiment 1, analyses focus on two types of judgments. First, I will present the 
findings related to explicit responsibility. Then, results concerning general negativity are 
presented. The mean and standard deviation for judgment ratings in each condition are presented 
in Table 4. In addition, an investigation into evidence of tainting (i.e., negative responses) when 
responsibility is rated at zero will be discussed.  
Explicit Responsibility 
The overall frequency distribution of composite responsibility ratings (temporarily) 
collapsing over conditions is reported in Figure 4. As in Experiment 1, ratings of responsibility 
were fairly low (grand mean = 21.88). This figure also illustrated the limited variability of 
responsibility ratings. Nearly a half of participants (44%) in Conditions 1-3 responded that the 
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target had zero responsibility for the terrorist attacks. As in Experiment 1, the overall level of 
responsibility was fairly low in Conditions 1, 2, and 3 (Ms = 17.38, 32.38, 16.82, respectively). 
General Evaluation of the Target 
To determine the extent to which general negativity varied as a function of condition, I 
submitted participants’ factor scores (as derived from the PCA analyses in SPSS) to a one-way 
ANOVA. This analysis revealed a significant effect of condition, F(3, 160) = 17.439, ηp2 = .251, 
p < .001.  
The graph showing the pattern of means responsible for this effect is presented in Figure 
5. As seen here, the general pattern here was similar to the results of Experiment 1. That is, there 
appeared to be tainting of the son relative to the control, albeit to varying degrees. In order to 
more formally confirm the nature of these differences, I then conducted a series of contrast 
analyses. Contrasts yielded significant differences between all pairs of conditions (ps < .002), 
save for two: First, there was no statistically significant difference in general negativity between 
Condition 1 (Raised by terrorist/genetically related) and Condition 2 (Adopted by terrorist/no 
genetic relation), F(1, 78) = 2.065, p = .155, Cohen’s d = .33. Second, there was no difference 
between Condition 1 (Raised by terrorist/genetically related) and Condition 3 (Adopted by 
another family/ genetic link to terrorist), F(1, 81) = 3.01, p = .09, Cohen’s d = .74.     
Further Investigation into General Negativity in the Absence of Any 
 Explicit Responsibility 
As in Experiment 1, it is again useful to examine the pattern of tainting among 
participants who explicitly indicated no responsibility on the part of the son (i.e., consistently 
made responsibility ratings of zero). Using the same analytic approach as in Experiment 1, I then 
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submitted the responsibility index to a one-way ANOVA. This analysis yielded a main effect of 
condition, F(3, 92) = 6.389, p = .001, ηp2 = .18.  
The pattern of means corresponding to this effect is shown in Figure 6. Additional 
contrast analyses revealed evidence of tainting relative to the control target in two instances. In 
particular, analyses revealed that the control condition was significantly different from ratings 
made in (a) Condition 1 (Raised by terrorist/genetically related), F(1, 61) = 15.703 p < .001, 
Cohen’s d  = 1.04, as well as in (b) Condition 2 (Adopted by terrorist/no genetic relation), F(1, 
54) = 6.767, p = .01, Cohen’s d = .77. However, ratings by participants who were assigned to 
Condition 3 (Adopted by another family/ genetic link to terrorist) did not differ from control, 
F(1, 59) = .115, p = .736, Cohen’s d = .10. Thus, in two out of the three “son” conditions, I again 
found evidence of tainting vis a vis the terrorist father, even when responsibility ratings were 
zero.  
Discussion 
Although the conceptual issues under concern were the same as Experiment 1, I used a 
somewhat different methodological approach in Experiment 2. The most important aspect of 
these changes is that they eliminated a few confounds that were present in the first study. For 
example, unlike my first study, all participants were presented with same short “pseudo-
diagnostic paragraph about the young boy, and all were provided with the same impression 
formation instructions. These changes also allowed me to compare and contrast two slightly 
different approaches to constructing the control condition. In particular, one version of the 
control removed all of the information about the terrorist/Paris attacks (the version that was most 
closely related to the control condition used in Experiment 1). The other version left the terrorist 
information intact, but did not present any connections between the young boy and the terrorist 
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who participants had read about earlier. Interestingly, results revealed negligible differences 
between the two control conditions. Hence, at least in this study, generally priming participants 
with the threat of terrorism did not appreciably change how participants responded to the young 
Arab boy.   
 In sum, findings provided converging evidence for conclusions drawn in Experiment 1. 
In both investigations, within-family tainting occurred for targets related to a terrorist. Again, 
responsibility ratings were very low, whereas significant general negativity toward son targets 
emerged. That is, the father/son relationship between criminal and target (collapsed over 
genetic/social relationships) led people to feel aversive toward an innocent boy. Even further, in 
cases where the target had been raised by the terrorist, tainting occurred even when responsibility 
ratings are zero. Together, patterns of within-family tainting between Experiments 1 and 2 were 
very similar.  
EXPERIMENT THREE 
 
Dual process theory considers the nature of two systems of processing: automatic 
(System 1) versus controlled (System 2; Evans, 1984; Kahneman, 2011; for a review, see 
Sherman, Gawronski, & Trope, 2014). System 1 encompasses processing that is relatively fast, 
immune to conscious control, and that requires minimal attentional resources (Bargh & Uleman, 
1989). Research and theory in social cognition has effectively highlighted the automatic nature 
of many types of social judgment, including but not limited to those associated with stereotyping 
and prejudice (Roediger, 1990; Banaji & Greenwald, 1995). Conversely, System 2 represents 
controlled (i.e., “slow”) processing. Judgments made with controlled processing are much more 
reliant on one’s effort and conscious use of mental resources.   
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As observed in the first two experiments of this paper, I found evidence of tainting of an 
otherwise innocent son, even among participants who explicitly disavowed any responsibility for 
the actions of his father. This suggests—although it certainly does not prove—that the tainting 
process in question may be guided by relatively automatic processes. In other words, if a 
participant explicitly believed that the son was not guilty of any of the misdeeds of his father, 
then this would suggest, on a rational level, that participants would not respond to him in a 
negative way. Yet, my results did appear to show some evidence of tainting, even among such 
participants. This apparent contradiction could, in principle, be resolved if the tainting process is 
occurring relatively automatically. Adding to the plausibility of this idea is the general findings 
from research and theory on “magical beliefs” and moral contamination (Nemeroff & Rozin, 
2000). Studies in this area have shown that judgments of a stimulus can often be “tainted” even 
though there is no rational reason for this effect to occur (Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986).  
The Logic of Cognitive Load Manipulations 
 Suppose, for the moment, that the tainting processes revealed in this dissertation are 
guided by automatic processes, but that the responsibility ratings are governed by controlled 
processes. If this presumption is correct, then an experimental manipulation of cognitive load 
offers a relatively straightforward set of predictions. As for the pattern of tainting per se, a 
manipulation of cognitive load should not have any effects.  In other words, if the tainting 
process is not dependent on the consumption of cognitive resources, then a manipulation 
designed to reduce the availability of cognitive resources should have no effect.   
 In the case of responsibility ratings, one should expect an effect of cognitive load (again, 
presuming that these judgments are guided by controlled processing). In particular, one would 
expect participants to generate higher ratings of responsibility if resources are depleted than if 
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they are not. Stated another way, the reason that participants are generating low ratings of 
responsibility could, in theory, be due to the implementation of relatively controlled processes.  
If I was to take away the cognitive resources needed for this process, one would thus expect 
participants to be more likely to rate the son as more responsible for the sins of his father than 
would otherwise be the case. One could also frame this effect in terms of judgmental correction.  
In theory, participants might have an initial inclination to blame the son for the actions of his 
father, but then correct for this conclusion because it is “not rational.” A cognitive load 
manipulation could, according to this logic, circumvent or “knock out” this correction processes.  
The previous literature offers some indirect support for this conjecture. Take for example, 
van Knippenberg, Dijksterhuis, and Vermeulen (2003)’s work. This experiment investigated 
judgments of the guilt of a defendant as a function of activated stereotype (positive vs negative) 
and cognitive load. When mental resources were limited (i.e., under high load), participants 
seemed to rely more on the negative associations of the stereotype in question, and rendered higher 
judgments of guilt and harsher suggestions for punishment. Thus, stereotypes about those being 
tried for a crime (defendants) were exacerbated when mental resources were limited by cognitive 
load manipulation. In addition, stereotypes have been found to strengthen with decreased 
processing capacity (Allen, Sherman, Conrey, & Stroessner, 2009).  
In summary, the results from Experiments 1 and 2 provided provocative evidence of an 
apparent “disconnect” between judgments regarding explicit responsibility and aversion. One 
way of explaining this disconnect is to presume that responsibility ratings are guided by 
controlled processes, but that the tainting process is relatively automatic. The present study was 
designed to test the viability of this idea through a cognitive load manipulation.  
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Method 
Participants and Design 
A total of 251 residents of the United States (77 male, 170 female, 0 trans, 2 prefer not to 
answer) were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk, in return for a small gift voucher. 
Two participants were not US citizens and were omitted from analyses (N=249). The design 
included two between-subjects variables. One of these pertained to manipulation of target type, 
containing three levels (see ahead). The other variable pertained to cognitive load (high vs. low).  
Hence, the design was a 3 (Target type) x 2 (Cognitive load) between-subjects design.  
Stimuli and Procedure 
After completing individual difference variables, participants were randomly assigned to 
judge three types of targets, using three of the conditions from Experiment 2: Condition 1 
(Raised by terrorist/genetically related), Condition 3 (Adopted by another family/genetic link to 
terrorist), Condition 5 (Control-terror information absent)4. The target descriptions 
corresponding to each of these conditions is shown in Appendix E. To facilitate comparison with 
my earlier studies, I retain these labels in this study. Within each of these three conditions, 
participants were randomly assigned to either a high versus low cognitive load condition. Thus, 
providing six unique conditions.  
Implementation of Cognitive Load Manipulation 
The general approach to this manipulation was generally modelled after a procedure 
employed by Conway and Gawronski (2013), who also conducted their research with an online 
sample.  After reading their assigned description, participants in this study were presented with 
the following instructions, along with an image containing objects and alpha-numeric characters:  
“Before the next set of questions, we have an additional task that we’d like you to do in 
the meantime. 
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As you can see below, we have presented you with a matrix of colored objects along with 
some symbols and text. Your task, at this point, is to memorize that entire image as best 
you can. The goal is to be able to “see” the entire image in your mind’s eye, even after 
you advance to the next screen. Try to memorize the entire image, not just one or two 
parts of it. 
  
At a later point in this study, we are going to ask you some questions about this image. It 
is VERY IMPORTANT that you “imprint” this image in your mind. Keep in mind that 
this is a “pure memory” task. Thus, please do not write down anything down on a 
separate piece of paper or on your computer.” 
 
Inspired by manipulations used in previous experiments (Gilbert & Osborne, 1989; Conway & 
Gawronski, 2013), images presented to participants in the high cognitive load condition included 
a string of seven alpha-numeric characters (e.g., Hj69*7p), whereas images used in the low 
cognitive load included short pairs of alpha-numeric characters (e.g., Hj). Cognitive load 
manipulation materials are presented in Appendix F. 
As with most implementations of cognitive load manipulation, it is important to have a 
memory probe task that occurs after the target judgment that was made “under load”.  In other 
words, each implementation of the cognitive load manipulation consists of three stages: (a) the 
introduction of the cognitive load (i.e., the string to be held in working memory), (b) judgment of 
the target person, and then (c) memory probe, which asks participants to accurately reproduce the 
string of characters that they were asked to hold in working memory.  
Therefore, participants in the high load condition, were asked to recall the sequences of 
seven alpha-numerical characters (e.g., A red circle had a string of characters printed in the 
middle. It began with "Hj..." followed by five other characters. In the space below, please type in 
the full seven characters, including the Hj. If you are unsure, just make the best guess you can.). 
Analogously, those in the low load condition were asked to recall the two alpha-numeric 
characters (e.g., A red circle had a string of characters printed in the middle. It began with "H.." 
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followed by one other character. In the space below, please type in the two characters, including 
the H.  If you are unsure, just make the best guess you can.). A text box was provided for the 
participants to enter the sequence presented to them.  
 Consistent with the approach taken by Conway and Gawronski (2013), the cognitive load 
manipulation was actually repeated three times, interspersed through the judgment task. In 
particular, about one third the way through the judgment task, the aforementioned procedure was 
used (presentation of string to be remembered, judgments of the son, memory probe). Then, for 
the middle third of the judgments, the same process was used, as was the case for the latter third 
of judgments. However, because the order of judgment type (e.g., general traits, feelings, 
responsibility) was completely randomized, this ensured that every type of judgment was equally 
“loaded” compared to the other.  
Demographics  
As in Experiments 1 and 2, information about participant gender, race, education, and 
income were collected. Frequencies, means, and standard deviations were similar to those in 
Experiments 1 and 2 and are reported in Appendix G. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses on Cognitive Load  
In an initial set of analyses, I conducted extensive probing to see if this manipulation had 
any effects in my data. It did not. Of particular note, there was no evidence that the manipulation 
affected responsibility ratings, either in its own right, or in combination with the manipulation of 
the features of the target person, all ps > .60. Nor was there any evidence that this manipulation 
affected ratings of general negativity (i.e., as markers of tainting), all ps > .50. Moreover, further 
probing continued to generate null effects when I made further delineations among participants 
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in terms of whether they were relatively accurate or not in the memory probe condition. Simply 
put, the manipulation of cognitive load had no effects at all. For the ease of expositional clarity, 
therefore, the analyses to be reported below collapse over this variable.  
Analyses of Responsibility 
The overall frequency distribution of responsibility composites (collapsing over 
conditions) reveals similar patterns to frequencies shown for Experiments 1 and 2. The frequency 
distribution is reported in Figure 7. As in Experiments 1 and 2, ratings of responsibility were 
fairly low (grand mean = 17.26) and nearly one third of participants (32%) in Conditions 1 and 3 
responded that the target had zero responsibility for the terrorist attacks. In this experiment, there 
were only two conditions in which responsibility ratings were collected, that is, Condition 1 
(Raised by terrorist/genetically related) and Condition 3 (Adopted by another family/genetic link 
to terrorist). Paralleling results from Experiments 1 and 2, responsibility ratings between these 
two conditions, were very similar (Ms = 20.19 and 14.36, respectively). 
General Negativity 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, an unrotated factor score was computed and saved from a 
factor analysis of all of the dependent variables (except for the responsibility items).  The first 
factor (general negativity) accounted for 58% of the variance and item loadings were similar to 
those found in Experiments 1 and 2.  
An overall analysis of variance once again revealed significant differences in average 
negativity as a function of experimental condition, F(2, 249) = 29.828, ηp2 = .195, p < .001 for 
the omnibus test. The pattern of means corresponding to this analysis is shown in Figure 8. 
Follow-up contrast analyses revealed significant differences involving all possible pairs of 
conditions. That is, Condition 1 was different from Condition 3 as well as Conditions 5, and 
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Conditions 3 and 5 were different from each other, all ps ≤ .003). In sum, the son with both 
genetic and social connections to the terrorist (Condition 1) was rated the more negatively than 
the son with only a genetic connection (Condition 3) as well as in comparison to the control 
(Condition 5). In addition, the son with only a genetic connection (Condition 3) was perceived 
significantly more negatively than the control target (Condition 5). Thus, merely sharing genes 
with a wrongdoer is enough to elicit tainting. 
Further Investigation into General Negativity in the Absence of Any  
Explicit Responsibility 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, it was of theoretical interest to test for evidence of tainting 
(i.e., general negativity) even when responsibility ratings were at zero. Using the approach taken 
in my first two studies, results again revealed a significant effect of experiment condition, F(2, 
163) = 5.639, p = .004, ηp2 = .07. The pattern of means corresponding to this analysis is shown in 
Figure 9.   
I next conducted follow up analyses involving each of the ‘son’ conditions (Conditions 1 
and 3) compared to control (Condition 5). The contrast of Condition 1 (Raised by 
terrorist/genetically related) versus Condition 5 (Control- without terrorist-related information) 
again yielded a significant result, F(1, 114) = 11.781, p = .001, Cohen’s d = .75. However, the 
contrast of Condition 3 (Adopted by another family/ genetic link to terrorist) versus Condition 5 
(Control- without terrorist-related information) was not significant, F(1, 133) = 2.486, p = .117, 
Cohen’s d = .28.   
Thus, as in Experiments 1 and 2, I found significant evidence of tainting, even among 
participants who had, themselves, explicitly disavowed the son’s responsibility for any of the 
actions of his father. However, the tainting effect in question emerged when there was a genetic 
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and social link between the son and his father, but it did not emerge when the son was adopted 
by another family.   
Discussion 
Experiment 3 was designed to (a) generate insight into the process level of judgments 
made in within-family tainting scenarios and (b) replicate the series of critical findings obtained 
in Experiments 1 and 2. As for my first goal, I used a manipulation of cognitive load in the 
service of understanding the role of automatic versus controlled processes in my paradigm.  
However, none of the analyses revealed any effect of this manipulation. As in the case of all null 
effects, it is difficult to make any definitive conclusions about the absence of this kind of effect. 
For example, it is possible that all of the key findings obtained in my paradigm reflect relatively 
automatic processes, i.e., those that do not demand a great deal of cognitive resources. In other 
words, if all of these processes use very little resources to begin with, then a manipulation of 
cognitive load would presumably have little effect. However, it is also possible that the cognitive 
manipulation was simply ineffective (e.g., was not strong enough). I will consider these issues in 
more detail in the General Discussion section. 
Setting aside the null effects of the cognitive load manipulation, the results from 
Experiment 3 were valuable in their own right, as they replicated the findings from my first two 
studies. This was true in terms of several different types of analyses involving explicit 
responsibility as well as tainting (cf. Figures 7-9). 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The present set of studies generated several insights regarding the processes underlying 
inter-generational tainting effects. As such, the present research offers a substantive contribution 
to the extant literature, specifically work that has taken an experimental approach to such tainting 
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processes (Govern & Greco, 2002; Uhlmann, Zhu, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2012; Peak et al., 2016). 
One of the major findings from the present studies concerned a dissociation between explicit 
ratings of personal responsibility (i.e., assignment of blame to the son) and more general feelings 
of negativity. Even though participants generally assigned rather low levels of blame to the son, 
all three of my experiments revealed substantial evidence of tainting. Indeed, significant 
evidence for such tainting was found, even among participants who repeatedly gave the lowest 
possible rating of responsibility to the son.  
My work also addressed some important issues as they pertain to theory and research on 
essentialism (see also ahead for further elaboration). Generally speaking, an essentialism 
framework suggests that merely sharing genes with a terrorist would be enough to elicit a great 
deal of tainting. However, my results were not particularly supportive of this idea. More 
concretely, note that my design enabled me to track the contribution of “nature” (i.e., the 
presence versus absence of a genetic connection with the father) as well as “nurture” (i.e., 
whether the father raised the son or not). Generally speaking, the latter was much more important 
than the former. That is, the presence of tainting depended on whether the son was raised by the 
father—nurture—as opposed to whether there was a genetic link or not. These effects proved to 
be extremely robust. In particular, I found a nearly identical pattern across all three experiments.   
In addition to testing for moderation of within-family tainting by individual differences, 
Experiment 3 aimed to provide insight into the role of automatic versus controlled processes in 
my paradigm. In previous work, load manipulations have been found to hinder deliberative 
processing and promote heuristic-based processing (Biernat, Kobrynowicz, & Weber, 2003). The 
null effects obtained in Experiment 3 are open to at least two interpretations. On the one hand, 
this could indicate that all of the judgments made by participants in my paradigm were governed 
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by relatively automatic processes. However, it is also possible that my cognitive load 
manipulation did not actually work. Unfortunately, there is no easy “manipulation check” that 
can definitively prove whether a given cognitive load manipulation was successful or not. For 
example, if a participant correctly recalled the character string in the memory probe, this could 
mean that the participant was successfully “loaded up” by holding this information in working 
memory. However, it could also mean, simply, that the cognitive load task was too easy. It is 
also possible that these kinds of manipulations are best suited for completion in the lab (instead 
of an online setting). 
These and other issues related to cognitive load manipulations have been considered in 
depth by cognitive researchers (e.g., Pass, Tuovinen, Tabbers, & Van Gernven, 2003; Berggren, 
Hutton, & Derakshan, 2011). One important concern is the researcher’s ability to determine 
mental effort from performance on a recall task. That is to say, if a person is unable to recall all 
of the characters, it is unclear whether this means (1) the manipulation was too much to hold in 
short term memory or (2) they were not motivated to carefully attend to the task. Thus, future 
work would gain leverage in better understanding the automaticity of responses by employing 
alternative manipulations (perhaps related to mental effort instead of performance) in order to 
better determine automaticity of judgments.  
Relation of my Work to Research and Theory on Essentialism 
Research and theory related to essentialism has been examined in a variety of 
subdisciplines within the social sciences (e.g., child development, anthropology, intergroup 
relations, social psychology). Although this literature is too large to consider in any depth here, it 
is useful to offer some additional discussion of the complexity of this area and its relation to the 
present research.  
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Broadly speaking, the concept of essentialism proposes that there is a (perceived) 
“inherent property” shared by the members of a given category, such as race (Williams, 2001; 
Chao, Hong, & Chiu, 2013), gender (Meyer & Gelman, 2016), culture (Ngo, 2013), and family 
(Uhlmann et al., 2012). Of particular relevance to current concerns, Uhlmann et al. (2012)’s 
“common-sense essentialism” framework proposed that individuals are perceived to be tied by 
essential bonds of blood kinship. That is, the contamination of one person’s actions can spread 
from one person to another. The present within-family tainting paradigm examines that extent to 
which sons are tainted by the misdeeds of their fathers. The common-sense framework suggests 
that the degree of tainting should be at least somewhat connected to the degree of genetic 
relatedness. However, as noted earlier, this is not what Govern and Greco (2002) or the present 
work found. Instead, on the average, participants in this set of studies did not take an essentialist 
approach. A target who was raised by the perpetrator—but not genetically related to him—were 
judged significantly more negatively than the target with only a genetic relationship. In this 
regard, my findings appear to be more consistent with the findings reported by Govern and 
Greco (2002) than with Uhlmann et al. (2012).  
It is important to note, however, that the conclusions reached about the tainting process—
including any inferences made about essentialism—may depend strongly on the domain in which 
that process is studied. In other words, even if a given research paradigm finds evidence for 
essentialism, one should not automatically assume that such evidence will also be found in an 
entirely different paradigm. 
For example, some feminist scholars have suggested that people generally think about 
gender (i.e., the difference between men and women) in essentialist ways. That is, they consider 
that all men have a certain “essence” (beyond their objectively verifiable biological differences) 
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that makes them foundationally different from women, and vice versa (Grosz, 1995). The truth 
value of this assertion—that people perceive gender in an essentialist way—represents an issue 
that is entirely distinct from the issues being probed in my own research. Stated another way, the 
fact that I did not find much evidence for essentialism in this particular paradigm obviously does 
not “falsify” or negate conclusions that might have been reached about essentialism in a different 
paradigm. In short, essentialism represents a complex idea that can be investigated in many 
different types of scientific paradigms. Evidence that is generated for—or against—essentialism 
in one paradigm should not necessarily generalize to any other paradigm, without considering the 
ways that those paradigms are similar or different.   
Caveats and Directions for Future Research 
As with any other programmatic line of work, the present set of studies contain some 
limitations and highlight the need for future research. As noted in the context of discussing the 
results of Experiment 3, future work is clearly needed to further understand the role of automatic 
versus controlled processes in tainting. Several other avenues for future work can be identified as 
well. Perhaps most important is the fact that familial connections obviously go far beyond 
father/son relationships. Other kinds of familial relationships (e.g., father/daughter, siblings, 
cousins) can and should be studied in order to understand tainting processes in the context of 
other types of family connections. In addition, nuances of the relationships may play a key role 
in predicting tainting. For example, whether or not the social connection occurred later in life 
(e.g., adopted at the age of nine instead of at birth) could impact judgments of the target.  
Also important to study are the boundary conditions related to transgressions/crime 
committed by the wrongdoer. The present paradigm involved a certain type of misdeed (i.e., 
terrorism) that is unambiguously negative. Nevertheless, transgressions come in all shapes and 
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sizes, and terrorism obviously represents only one example of a large universe of other types of 
transgressions. Future research is needed in order to understand how the tainting process, itself, 
may be moderated by the type of transgression at hand. For example, evidence of significant 
within-family tainting might only emerge if a crime was premeditated and involved physical 
harm to others (i.e., murder, terrorism) compared to other types of transgressions.  
 Lastly, the extent to which tainting judgments can have real-life consequences represents 
an important consideration that surely deserves greater attention. An interdisciplinary approach 
to familial tainting would shed light, for example, on the potential real-world consequences for 
people who are related to well-known criminals, but who have not committed any crimes 
themselves. Collaborative research with public policy experts and criminal justice researchers 
would be helpful in the pursuit of these goals.  
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FOOTNOTES 
1 In Experiment 1, an additional principal components analyses of social distancing and 
trait items was also completed. Here I used the residual correlation matrix (removing the effect 
of the manipulation). This analyses confirmed a single component (40% of the variance was 
explained by the first factor). 19 of the 23 items loaded higher than .5. Low loading items were 
similar to those loading weakly in the factor analyses of the standard dependent variable items 
(i.e., not residuals). Thus, my generation of factor scores described in Method sections are 
appropriate.  
2 Experiment 1 had a total of 160 people complete the survey. There were four targets to 
which participants would be randomly assigned. Thus, each cell included 40 participants. 
However, two participants were not US-citizens and one participant failed the attention check. 
Thus, these individuals were excluded from analyses, and the final sample size was 157. 
3 To investigate the normality of the dependent variable composites, I completed a series 
of skewness and kurtosis analyses for Experiments 1-3. Experiment 1, responsibility ratings had 
a skewness of .902 (SE = .223) and kurtosis of -.239 (SE = .442). General negativity showed 
skewness of -.264 (SE = .194) and kurtosis of -.954 (SE = .385). In Experiment 2, responsibility 
ratings had a skewness of 1.73 (SE = .194) and kurtosis of 1.772 (SE = .386). General negativity 
showed skewness of .591 (SE = .172) and kurtosis of -.032 (SE = .342). In Experiment 3, 
responsibility ratings had a skewness of 2.22 (SE = .154) and kurtosis of -4.05 (SE = .307). 
General negativity showed skewness of .591 (SE = .154) and kurtosis of -.160 (SE = .307). In 
sum, the distributions of responsibility ratings across the three experiments were moderately to 
highly skewed (.90 – 2.22). Distributions of negativity across the three experiments ranged from 
approximately symmetric to moderately skewed (-.26 – .59).  
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4 Based on evidence from Experiments 1 and 2, three variations of the target description 
were chosen. In particular, I wanted to contrast control (Condition 5) with the traditional raised 
by/genetically related son (Condition 1) and the son with only genetic connections (Condition 3). 
Conditions 1 and 3 were found to be significantly different from one another in terms of tainting 
and could illustrate how negativity varies by connection to a terrorist. The control condition used 
for Experiment 3 was also based on knowledge gained in Experiment 2. Thus, I used the control 
condition that was shared between both Experiments 1 and 2 that (a) did not include information 
about the terrorist attacks and (b) induced very low levels of negativity. Thus, using the same 
labels as Experiment 2, Conditions 1, 3, and 5 were included in this final investigation. 
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Table 1: Individual Difference Variables Collected in Experiments 1-3 
  
 1 2 3 
Need for Cognition (NFC) ü ü ü 
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) ü ü ü 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) ü ü ü 
Interdependence ü ü ü 
Honor Ideology (HIM) ü ü  
Collectivism ü ü  
Belief in Social Determinism (BSD)   ü 
Belief in Genetic Determinism (BGD)   ü 
 
 Note. ü indicates that the variable was included in the experiment. 
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Table 2: Factor Loadings of First Unrotated Factor (General Negativity)— Experiment 1 
 
 Factor 
Item 1 
I would feel angry. .862 
It would bother me bother me. .849 
Dangerous .848 
This would be upsetting to me. .846 
I would be reluctant to shake his hand. .842 
I would feel uneasy. .830 
Friendly -.807 
How positively would you feel towards him? -.807 
Unfriendly .805 
How negatively would you feel towards him? .799 
Honest -.793 
Immoral .790 
Dishonest .770 
I would feel uncomfortable. .757 
Moral -.754 
To what extent do you think Younes should be placed on the “No Fly” list? .744 
I would refuse to talk. .733 
I would feel calm and collected. -.722 
Should Younes be able to travel to the United States? -.693 
I would lose composure. .674 
Hardworking -.593 
Smart -.589 
Unintelligent .536 
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Table 3: Effects of Target Type on Judgments — Experiment 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  
 Condition 1 
(Raised by 
terrorist/ 
genetically 
related) 
Condition 2  
(Adopted by 
terrorist/ 
no genetic 
relation) 
Condition 3  
(Adopted by 
another family/ 
genetic link to 
terrorist) 
Condition 4 
(Control) 
 
Judgment     
Responsibility 20.04(23.60)    29.05(26.45)  16.97(22.53)  - 
General Negativity .55(.70) .57(.63) .20(.69) -1.33(.46) 
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Table 4: Effects of Target Type on Judgments— Experiment 2 
 Condition 1 
(Raised by 
terrorist/ 
genetically 
related) 
Condition 2 
(Adopted by 
terrorist/ 
no genetic 
relation) 
Condition 3 
(Adopted by 
another family/ 
genetic link to 
terrorist) 
Condition 4 
(Control- 
terror 
information 
present) 
 
Condition 5 
(Control- 
terror 
information 
absent) 
 
Judgment      
Responsibility 17.38(29.57) 32.38(36.88) 16.82(24.01) - - 
General Negativity .39(1.01) .72(.99) .02(.91) -.40(.75) -.67(.67) 
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Table 5: Effects of Target Type on Judgments— Experiment 3 
 Condition 1 
(Raised by terrorist/ 
genetically related) 
Condition 3 
(Adopted by another family/ 
genetic link to terrorist) 
Condition 5 
(Control- terror 
information absent) 
 
Judgment    
Responsibility 20.19(27.86) 14.36(26.27)  - 
General Negativity .51(.88)  .06(1.05)  -.56(.75)  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
	  59	  
Figure 1: Frequency of Responsibility Ratings – Experiment 1  
 
 
Note. 27.1% of Ps in son conditions indicated responsibility at 0 
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Figure 2: Mean General Negativity as a Function of Experimental Condition — Experiment 1 
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Figure 3: Mean General Negativity as a Function of Condition – “Zero Responsibility” 
Participants (see text)—Experiment 1 
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Figure 4: Frequency of Responsibility Ratings – Experiment 2  
 
   Note. 44.3% of Ps in son conditions indicated responsibility at 0. 
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Figure 5: Mean General Negativity as a Function of Condition — Experiment 2 
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Figure 6: Mean General Negativity as a Function of Condition – “Zero Responsibility” 
Participants (see text)—Experiment 2 
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Figure 7: Frequency of Responsibility Ratings – Experiment 3  
 
 
Note. 31.7% of Ps in son conditions had responsibility average of 0. 
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Figure 8: Mean General Negativity as a Function of Condition — Experiment 3 
 
 
 
Note. Means collapsed over cognitive load. 
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Figure 9: Mean General Negativity as a Function of Condition – “Zero Responsibility” 
Participants (see text)—Experiment 3 
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Appendix A: Terrorism Reminder and Terrorist Description 
1)   Instructions 
 
2)   Overview of Attack 
  
Background  graphic  1:  Overview of Attack 
 
In  the  image  below,  we  summarize  the  main  sequence  of  events  that  occurred  on  
November  13,  2015.  Please  read  this  information  carefully,  and  familiarize  yourself  with  
the  main  events  that  occurred.  Please  try  to  remember  the  main  details,  such  as  the  
location  in  which  the  highest  number  of  deaths  occurred. 
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3)   Terrorist Description  
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Appendix B: Target Descriptions— Experiment 1 
 
Condition 1 (Raised by terrorist/genetically related)
 
 
Condition 2 (Adopted by terrorist/no genetic relation)
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Condition 3 (Adopted by another family/genetic link to terrorist)
 
  
Condition 4 (Control) 
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Appendix C: Demographic Variable Descriptive Statistics – Experiment 1 
 
Age 
 N Range M SD 
Age 157 55 36.32 11.618 
 
Gender 
                                              N % 
Male 45 28.7 
Female 109 69.4 
Trans* 2 1.3 
Prefer not to answer 1 .6 
Total 157 100.0 
 
Education  
                                                                         N % 
High school 11 7 
Some college/Associates degree 62 39.5 
Bachelors degree 43 27.4 
Some postgraduate study 14 8.9 
Other 1 .6 
Masters degree 21 13.4 
Doctorate/Medical degree 5 3.2 
Total 157 100 
 
Ethnicity  
                                                                         N % 
White 127 80.9 
Black 14 8.9 
Hispanic 7 4.5 
Asian 6 3.8 
American Indian/Alaskan/Hawaiian 1 .6 
Other 2 1.3 
Total 157 100 
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Income 
                                                                         N % 
Less than $1,000 3 1.9 
$1,000 to $9,999 6 3.8 
$10,000 to $19,999 9 5.7 
$20,000 to $29,999 19 12.1 
$30,000 to $49,999 39 24.8 
$50,000 to $74,999 35 22.3 
$75,000 to $99,999 24 15.3 
$100,000 to $149,999 18 11.5 
$150,000 to $199,999 2 1.3 
$200,000 to $499,999 2 1.3 
Total 157 100 
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Appendix D: Target Descriptions— Experiment 2 
 
Condition 1 (Raised by terrorist/genetically related)
  
 
Condition 2 (Adopted by terrorist/no genetic relation)
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Condition 3 (Adopted by another family/genetic link to terrorist) 
  
  
Conditions 4  & 5 
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Appendix E: Target Descriptions— Experiment 3 
 
Condition 1 (Raised by terrorist/genetically related)  
 
 
Condition 3 (Adopted by another family/genetic link to terrorist) 
 
 
Condition 5 (Control)    
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Appendix F: Cognitive Load Images – Experiment 3 
 
                High Cognitive Load     Low Cognitive Load 
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Appendix G: Demographic Variable Descriptive Statistics – Experiment 3 
 
Age 
 N Range M SD 
Age 249 67 34.11 11.713 
 
Gender 
                                           Frequency % 
Male 77 30.9 
Female 170 68.3 
Trans* 0 0 
Prefer not to answer 2 .8 
Total 249 100.0 
 
Ethnicity  
                                                                         N % 
White 195 78.3 
Black 14 5.6 
Hispanic 22 8.8 
Asian 14 5.6 
American Indian/Alaskan/Hawaiian 1 .4 
Other 2 .8 
Prefer not to answer 1 .4 
Total 249 100.0 
 
Education  
                                                                         N % 
Some high school 2 .8 
High school 20 8.0 
Some college/Associates degree 98 39.4 
Bachelors degree 78 31.3 
Some postgraduate study 14 5.6 
other 1 .4 
Masters degree 30 12.0 
Doctorate/Medical degree 6 2.4 
Total 249 100 
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Income 
                                                                         N % 
Less than $1,000 5 2.0 
$1,000 to $9,999 7 2.8 
$10,000 to $19,999 16 6.4 
$20,000 to $29,999 27 10.8 
$30,000 to $49,999 54 21.7 
$50,000 to $74,999 66 26.5 
$75,000 to $99,999 33 13.3 
$100,000 to $149,999 26 10.4 
$150,000 to $199,999 6 2.4 
$200,000 to $499,999 1 .4 
$500,000 or more 1 .4 
prefer not to answer 7 2.8 
Total 249 100 
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APPENDIX H: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE ANALYSES  
NOT REPORTED IN THE MAIN TEXT 
 
Experiment 1 
 
Partial correlations between DVs and individual differences, controlling for condition. 
 Honor Collectivism Interdependence RWA SDO NFC 
Responsibility .216* -.099 -.023 .327*** .342*** -.055 
Negativity .235* .121 .261** .330*** .328*** -.217* 
p < .001***, p < .01**, p < .05* 
 
 
Experiment 2 
 
Partial correlations between DVs and individual differences, controlling for condition.  
 Honor Collectivism Interdependence RWA SDO NFC 
Responsibility .296** .025 -.133 .228* .340*** -.127 
Negativity .300** -.038 -.074 .332*** .354*** -.102 
p < .001***, p < .01**, p < .05* 
 
 
Experiment 3 
 
Partial correlations between DVs and individual differences, controlling for condition. 
 BSD BGD Interdependence RWA SDO NFC 
Responsibility .047 .191** -.081 .222*** .276*** -.044 
Negativity .171** .276*** -.167** .361*** .460*** -.222*** 
p < .001***, p < .01**, p < .05* 
 
 
 
